NATASHA YADAV
Russian and Syrian Troops. Picture via: EPA/Sergei Chirikov
The end of the Cold War saw the demise of the Soviet Union, the victory of the United States, and as a result, a shift towards neoliberalism in international relations and global politics. The heightened tensions and rivalry between the two states took a toll on the Soviet Union far more than the United States, in the economic, political, diplomatic, and military fields. In order to transition beyond the humiliating downfall of the Soviet Union to its foe, the Russian Federation had to re-emerge as a strong state, and seize any opportunity wherein it could once again prove its might and assert its status as a Great Power. While Russia does hold a Permanent Five status in the Security Council, it got an opportunity to explicitly showcase its power by intervening in the Middle East, particularly through its military intervention in the Syrian conflict in 2015. Russia’s re-emergence as a state moving beyond its regional power status, and expanding its sphere of influence, is a testament to its leadership and revisionist aspirations. Such dynamics have begun to reflect the fact that Russia, once again wishes to become a prominent part of the status quo.
In order to maintain its status as a great power, Russia must have an ambitious foreign policy, possibly act as a hegemon and exert it’s will onto other states, as per the approach of the Realist School of Thought. In this case, Russia’s actions seem to align with the principles of “Offensive Realism” as outlined by John Mearsheimer, wherein nation-states act aggressively and tend towards hegemony, in order to achieve relative gains as opposed to competitors. In this regard, Syria is geo-strategically vital for Russia, as Russia's diplomatic and military efforts in this country could provide for a perfect platform through which Moscow can re-enter the international arena beyond its own geography. Prior to its intervention in 2015, Russia exercised its veto powers in the United Nations Security Council in order to counter the resolutions promoted by the Western and Arab states which pushed for sanctions against Syria. Furthermore, Russia also exercised its veto powers by countering resolutions in 2011 and 2012 respectively which called for military interventions in the region, namely within Syria. The Syrian conflict officially began in 2015, wherein Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian government requested assistance against rebel forces attempting to overthrow the government. It would prove to be a perfect opportunity for Russia as these rebels were backed by the United States, Turkey, and other Western forces.
The following points are used as a justification towards Russia’s intervention within the Middle East: Providing support to an ally, the aspect of counterterrorism, challenging the role of the United States, and for the demonstration effect in the Middle East and beyond. To begin with, there are historical and strategic aspects as to why Russia backed Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian government, tracing back to the Cold War Era, wherein the Soviet Union and Syria maintained friendly relations, and even allied together in the Second World War against the axis powers. Moreover, the two states signed a “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” in the 1980s which consisted of regular consultations on bilateral and multilateral issues of interests, coordination of responses in the event of a crisis and military consultation, with the treaty in force till date. Moreover, during the Cold War, the states were tied militarily as well, to the extent that the Soviet Union had naval bases within Syrian territory, a number which has only grown as of today given the increase in the naval and air force bases belonging to the Russian Federation in Syria. It is also to be noted that in the year 1992, in showing reciprocity in the relationship, the Syrian government was one of the first to recognize the Russian Federation as a legal successor to the Soviet Union. In addition to such political and diplomatic ties, both Syria and Russia share economic ties as well, specifically with regards to the sale of arms and weaponry. There has also been immense cooperation in the energy and infrastructure sectors, as seen through Russian assistance in the creation of a natural gas facility and construction company along with oil extractors in Syria. Russia is also contributing greatly towards Syrian post-conflict reconstruction, an alternative to similar activities conducted by the United States in Iraq.
Russia and Syria share friendly bilateral ties tracing back to the Cold War Era, however, Russia’s decision to get heavily involved in the Syrian War moves beyond this dynamic. Today, Russia uses the justification of helping an ally in seizing the opportunity of becoming a hegemonic power, one which it wishes to achieve by acting as a mediator or peacemaker in a volatile region. This shrewd reasoning allows Russia to pursue an active foreign policy, one which increases its sphere of influence beyond the Eurasian region, allowing it to once again oppose great powers and hegemons, primarily the United States and its allies. Russia’s involvement in Syria initiates a “ripple effect” in the Middle East, wherein Russia is perceived as a key power broker between two opposing groups, and a capable military actor in the Middle East. The creation of the latter identity or narrative of Russia in the Middle East is one which is further escalated by the sudden withdrawal of US troops as per the decision of President Trump. The withdrawal has resulted in a “power vacuum” within the Middle East, one which is rapidly being filled by Russia. Prior to the withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East, a certain “balance of power” existed between the international powers in the region, one which ensured that any efforts by external actors did not solely favour one particular state and its allies. This, however, is no longer the case, for the slow withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East, to a large extent, reduces the power that its Western European allies hold in the region. This has undoubtedly allowed for significant Russian in-roads.
In this context, the perceptions that many hold for the Russian state in the Middle East has also changed. Increasingly being viewed as a dynamic actor, Russia has been able to sustain its military presence in the region as well as balance itself between regional adversaries. Not only has it maintained relations with both Syria and Turkey but also between Israel and Iran, a strategy that perfectly caters to its revisionist aspirations. This ability to act as a “swing state” in the Middle East is furthering Russia’s ambitions to move beyond its role as a regional power, and obtain geopolitical gains. Russia’s active involvement in the Middle East, and its ability to seize opportunities to work in its favour, is reflective of a certain revisionist ideology, as desired by its leader. The narrative of a reliable ally and mediator built around Russian involvement in the region may soon serve the country beyond the Middle East. Former allies of the Soviet Union and current allies of the Russian Federation will take note of such favourable dynamics and seek to act accordingly.
The use of Realpolitik and the Realist School of Thought is one which can be applied with regards to Russia’s re-emergence and the role of the Middle East. The state’s behaviour indicates its desire to obtain power-maximization and increase its sphere of influence, one which it is slowly achieving by engaging in “Smart Power” politics. Coined by Joseph Nye, “Smart Power” refers to a state which combines “Hard Power”, that is, military and economic means, along with “Soft Power”, its diplomatic, cultural, and historical ties, in order to further its foreign policy and national interest. In this regard, not only has Russia intervened militarily in assistance of the Syrian government but also contributed towards its post-conflict reconstruction plans. Russia’s presence in the Middle East thus proves the aforementioned. Furthermore, Russia’s actions seem to be based on the principles of realpolitik, which allows it to prioritize its national interest, gain power in the international arena and possibly reflect its former status during the Cold War.
Russia’s desire to establish a new identity in the post-Cold War Era, shedding the negative aspects of the downfall of the Soviet Union, yet simultaneously maintaining the power it had during this time, is reflected in its current actions within the Middle East. The desire to create a new identity as the Russian Federation, acts as a juxtaposition in Russia’s behaviour as a revisionist state with regards to its former superpower status as the Soviet Union. Russia’s actions and its role in the Middle East are furthering its ambitions to become a Great Power, however, it is essential to note the irony with regards to this state. After all one must not forget that while Russia is using the Middle East as a stepping stone in furthering its Great Power ambitions, it was the same Middle East, years ago, which played a key role in the demise of the Soviet Union.
The views expressed and suggestions made in the articles are solely of the authors in their personal capacity and the Center for Middle East Studies and O.P. Jindal Global University do not endorse the same.